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Abstract
I explore various ways of integrating the framework for predeterminism, agency, and ability in
[P. McNamara, Nordic J. Philos. Logic 5 (2) (2000) 135] with a framework for obligations. However,
the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of a non-agential yet personal
obligation operator and a non-deontic (and non-normal) agency operator. This is contrary to the main
current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements.
Instead, I take the basic form to be an agent’s being obligated to be such that p. I sketch some logics
for agential obligation based on personal obligation and agency, first in a fairly familiar context that
rules out conflicting personal obligations (and derivatively, conflicting agential obligations), and then
in contexts that do allow for conflicts (of both sorts). Finally, a solution to van Fraassen’s puzzle is
sketched, and an important theorem is proved.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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In [21] (and at DEON’00), I explored a simple framework for agency, predetermina-
tion and ability (in the process of developing a framework for agent-evaluative notions like
praise and blame).1 Call this simple framework the “APA framework”. In the current paper,
I explore various ways of integrating the APA framework with a framework for personal
obligations. To do the latter, I explore a familiar tradition, one that combines a non-agential
deontic operator with a non-deontic agential operator to yield a derivative analysis of an
agential deontic operator. However, I have in mind an exploration of the strategy suggested
E-mail address: paulm@cisunix.unh.edu (P. McNamara).
1 As noted in [21] in greater detail, the core of the agency framework employed here is an expansion of that
employed in [18,24,25]. This framework is inspired, in part, by Elgesem [9] (see also [10]). The approach to
pre-determination and ability is inspired by Brown [4]. My debt to Chellas [7] is apparent. The debt to Krogh and
Herrestad is discussed explicitly in the current text. I also benefited by discussions of an earlier version of this
paper with Mark Brown, Jorg Hansen, Andrew Jones, Leon van der Toore, and Peter Vranas.
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at the end of [19], which is critical of the traditional employments of this sort of analysis.
In particular, the deontic operator employed is interpreted as one lying in between an im-
personal deontic operator (e.g., “it is obligatory that”, “it ought to be the case that”) and an
agential deontic operator (e.g., “it is obligatory for Doe to bring it about that”, “Doe ought
to bring it about that”).2
In Section 1, I first sketch the predetermination portion of the APA framework from [21],
and then integrate this with an Andersonian–Kangerian deontic “reduction” to get an
SDL-generating modal framework for non-agential personal obligation. Next, I sketch
the agency portion of the APA framework and integrate it with the deontic framework.
Because the Andersonian–Kangerian deontic framework is so familiar, it is interesting to
first see how in even such a strong framework for obligation, the weak monotonic classi-
cal logic for agency constrains the derivative logic for agential obligation. In Section 2, I
drop the Andersonian–Kangerian reduction, and turn to weaker and more plausible sys-
tems for non-agential personal obligation, especially with an eye to allowing for conflicts
of such obligations. I then explore various conflict-allowing systems for non-agential per-
sonal obligation with special attention to their impact on the derivative logics for agential
obligation. I then briefly reintroduce a deontic constant in our conflict-allowing setting. In
this context, the constant will have a restorative rather than reductive role, and the direction
of the old reduction is, so to speak, reversed. Finally, I discuss a problem for my approach
and sketch a solution.
1. A simple deontic-modal-agential framework
1.1. The APA framework—predetermination
The main operator in our framework for predetermination is:
PRp: It is (as of now) predetermined (for John Doe) that p.3
We use standard Kripke structures for modeling “PR”:
CO ⊆ W × W.
COij iff what happens at j is consistent with our agent’s current abilities and disabilities
at i.
2 Horty’s [17] is highly recommended as a complement to [19]. Horty focuses on “it ought to be the case
that Doe sees to it that”, and criticizes that as an analysis of what an agent ought to do, as well as making an
interesting critical assessment of the literature regarding that strategy. The agency framework employed here is
weaker, and “it ought to be the case that”, an impersonal deontic operator, is rather different from the personal but
non-agential operator employed here to help in defining full-fledged agential obligations. His objections to that
reductive strategy do not readily apply to the Krogh–Herrestad reductive strategy.
3 Other readings might be: it is (as of now) inevitable/fixed/settled (for John Doe) that p. Note that since
we do not consider multiple agents here, we do not bother with a superscript on PR standing for John Doe
(e.g., PRJ) as would be necessary with two or more agents. Nonetheless, as indicated, the intended reading is
personal. Similar remarks apply to the subsequent Andersonian–Kangerian deontic constant, obligation operators,
and agency operators.
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The truth condition for PR is the usual one:M |=i PRp iff ∀j(COij → M |=j p).
We introduce the dual, “it is consistent with our agent’s abilities that p”:
COp =
df
∼PR∼p,
M |=i COp iff ∃j(COij & |=j p),
and we add a single constraint,
CO-RFLX: COii.4
That there is a p-world consistent with my abilities does not entail that p is within my
abilities. Just consider any tautology, or any independent action someone else may or may
or not perform.5
The normal KT System for PR (PR-KT),
SL: All Tautologies
PR-K: PR(p → q) → (PRp → PRq)
PR-T: PRp → p
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
PR-NEC: If  p then  PRq,
is well-known to be sound and complete in all CO-reflexive models.
1.2. An Andersonian–Kangerian deontic-modal framework
We now add an Andersonian–Kangerian constant, d , to the syntax:
d: The demands on John Doe are all met (or “John Doe’s responsibilities
are all met”).
We represent “d” ’s extension as a set of worlds, DEM,
DEM ⊆ W,
and we give “d” ’s truth-conditions accordingly:
M |=i d iff i ∈ DEM.
We define our non-agential but personal obligation operator:
OBp =
df
PR(d → p) [Df-OB],
4 Given the intended interpretation, it is plausible to think of CO as an equivalence relation, but we ignore this
here.
5 See [21] for a bit more detail on this module.
120 P. McNamara / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 117–152
and read it as follows:OB: it is obligatory for John Doe to be such that (or “it is obligatory for John
Doe that it be the case that”).6
We add an axiom governing the deontic constant, d:
d: COd (i.e., ∼PR∼d).
Call the resulting system “PR-KTd”.
Axiom d is validated by the condition that the satisfaction of Doe’s responsibilities is
consistent with his abilities:
COd: ∀i∃j(COij & j ∈ DEM).
The system PR-KTd is characterized by the class of all models satisfying this constraint
[20].
Recall that “COd” says that d’s truth is consistent with John Doe’s abilities, but it does
not say it is within his abilities, for good reason. John Doe may have delegated the last step
in his project to his assistant, and it may now be predetermined for Doe that his project will
be completed only if the assistant completes it, which she will. The project‘s completion
is no longer within Doe’s ability, but it is still consistent with his ability. Now just add that
the project’s completion is equivalent to d .
It is well known that SDL is contained in PR-KTd:
SL: All Tautologies
OB-NC: OBp → ∼OB∼p
OB-K: OB(p → q) → (OBp → OBq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
OB-NEC: If  p then  OBq.7
Given our intended interpretation of OB, d and CO, this means we are engaged in consid-
erable idealization, but we want to begin with this simple system to see how a very familiar
system for OB interacts with the less familiar non-normal logic for BA.
1.3. Interlude: are all obligations agential?
Our intended reading of “OB”, is suggested at the end of [19]. “OBp” is not intended
here to express the impersonal notion that it is obligatory that p. Rather “OBp” is intended
6 There are temporal issues here. For example, “OBp & d” is satisfiable in KTd, and “OBp & d ·→ p”
is a valid theorem. But if all the demands on Doe are met, then how could he (now) have any (outstanding)
obligations? Talk of responsibilities is perhaps better here, since we can have standing responsibilities that are
all currently satisfied. We must pass over these subtleties. See [5] for a good source on representing diachronic
aspects of obligation and fulfillment.
7 In fact the stronger system that results from adding “OB(OBp → p)” to SDL corresponds to KTd, but we
ignore this fact here. See [1,2].
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to express a personal obligation, one that John Doe, our mock person, is under. Nonethe-
less, it does not require that John Doe be the agent of p. As Krogh and Herrestad in [19]
illustrate, suppose,
. . . the manager of a firm is under an obligation that the companies financial statement
is reported to the company board once a month. Let’s assume that the manager has
a particularly helpful assistant. Without the managers consent this assistant sends the
financial status to the board each month, thus seeing to it that the manager’s obligation
is fulfilled. . . . the manager’s obligations are personal, but may be fulfilled by someone
else. (p. 151) [My stress.]
Let’s codify the point in a more explicit argument:
If all my obligations are agential, then each of my obligations is an obligation for me to
bring about some thing. If each of my obligations is an obligation for me to bring about
some thing, then none of my obligations can be fulfilled by someone else. But some of
my obligations can be fulfilled by someone else. Therefore, not all my obligations are
agential.
It certainly appears that the zealous assistant fulfills the manager’s obligation but the
manager did not even indirectly (e.g., by delegation) bring that about. Similarly, it may be
obligatory for you that your child does her homework, but it may also be that you are lucky,
and she does it on her own, with no prompting from you. If so, your obligation is fulfilled
with no effort on your part.8 Similarly, suppose you are obligated to be in Boston tomorrow,
and without your involvement, you are kidnapped and taken to Boston. Your obligation to
be in Boston is fulfilled without your agency. So “OB” is intended to express a personal
obligation, yet one that is not an agential obligation (an obligation to do) since it does not
require you to make any effort to fulfill it. Being obligated to do something is not what
makes an obligation personal on this account. What makes it personal, presumably, is that
if the obligatory thing doesn’t come to pass, you are potentially responsible. In contrast,
what makes an obligation agential is that only you can fulfill it—what is obligatory is that
you, yourself, do some thing.
Although I do not pretend that this argument is conclusive, it is interesting because it
indicates that
either obligations are not all agential or fulfillment of obligations is more complex and
subtle than has been assumed in deontic logic.
If obligations are all agential then they are all obligations that John Doe be the agent
of some action or state of affairs. But what then is it for an obligation to be fulfilled by
8 We might say that the manager and parent are each obligated to be such that if the thing in question is not
otherwise done, then s/he does it, but this just reinforces the next point, that an obligation can be an obligation to
be a certain way, not necessarily to act a certain way, and thus an obligation may be not only non-agential in the
complement, but may not even derive from such an obligation.
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someone else? If what is obligatory is that I myself do something, how can anyone else
fulfill that obligation? Maintaining that all obligations are agential will make fulfillment
more complex than generally assumed. Here we will explore the alternative that keeps
fulfillment simple.9 Let me briefly say a few further things in support of the plausibility of
reading “OB” as we do, and of distinguishing personal from agential obligation.
Consider the following:
(1)
Personal Non-Agential
/ \ / \
I’m obligated to be here.
This is an obligation to be in a location, not to do something. The sentential complement
is non-agential. (1) can be aptly paraphrased as:
(1′)I’m obligated to be such that I am here.
Now consider:
(2)
Personal Agential
/ \ / \
I’m obligated to bring it about that p.
This is a paradigm case of what we call an agential obligation. But consider:
(2′)I’m obligated to be such that I bring it about that p.
This appears to be equivalent to (2), but this suggests the possibility that personal oblig-
ation is the more general form (not to be confused with the more frequently used form),
and that agential obligation may be construed as a special case of personal obligation.
We will indeed represent an agential obligation as a personal obligation with an agential
complement.
True, my obligation to be somewhere would typically derive from an obligation to do
something, one that had being at the location in question as a necessary condition, so that
the latter would be a derived obligation. Still, derived obligations are obligations. Secondly,
this relationship between obligations to be and obligations to do does not always hold. It
seems perfectly alright to assert that a person is obligated to be cooperative, just, faithful,
honest, punctual, where this means to have the virtues in question, not merely to act in the
associated ways. Let’s pick one example:
John Doe is obligated to be cooperative (i.e., such that he is a cooperative person).
This sounds fine. Furthermore, there is no inconsistency in adding to this claim that John
Doe might already be cooperative; it might be a deep and stable part of his character. If
so, can his obligation to be cooperative be reduced to an obligation to do something? What
exactly? It can’t be to become cooperative. He is already there. Surely he is not required to
9 We leave open for future investigation the possibility that obligation is not always agential and fulfillment is
not always simple and straightforward.
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undo his cooperativeness and then reacquire it! Is it to make efforts to remain cooperative?
Why? We are imagining that it requires no effort whatsoever on his part to remain coop-
erative. Surely he does not have to go through the motions, mumbling to himself “I will
remain cooperative, by gummy!” in order to fulfill this obligation.
Now consider other evaluatives we need in deontic logic.10 For example, we can be
praiseworthy or blameworthy for having a certain trait. Unless we are being disingenuous,
when we praise or blame someone, we do so because we believe they are praiseworthy or
blameworthy, and we often praise and blame people sincerely for traits. In fact, we do so
even for traits that do not appear to be a function of a person’s agency at all. For example,
we praise people for being talented, smart, graceful, fast, etc. When we praise someone for
being kind or blame someone for being callous, we engage in a form of moral evaluation.
So what is the significance of insisting that personal obligation is agential, if other forms of
evaluation, even moral forms of evaluation, are not? Do we want logic alone to rule out the
substantive moral view that if I am blameworthy for being F then it is obligatory for me to
not be F because the latter lacks an agential complement? Do we really need this sweeping
thesis that obligations are agential, in order to vindicate the importance of agency to moral
evaluation?
If these reflections are on track, then it may be the case that connections between agency
and obligation have been a bit exaggerated of late.11 In fact, it may be that the most salient
obligations, obligations to do things, reduce to special cases of less salient obligations,
obligations to be certain ways. We assume that this perspective is worth exploring, and
proceed accordingly. Those who would insist that all obligations are agential need to make
their case. I doubt it can be made.
1.4. The APA framework—adding agency
We now introduce an agency operator:
BAp: John Doe Brings it About that p.
We use minimal models for the semantics:
BA : W → Pow(Pow(W)), that is, BAi ⊆ Pow(W),
M |=i BAp iff ‖p‖M ∈ BAi.
BAi denotes the set of propositions (possible empty) that our agent brings about at i.
Our basic system for BA, “TECNOCS” (“E” for “RE”), is:
BA-T:  BAp → p
BA-C:  (BAp & BAq) → BA(p & q)
BA-NO:  ∼BA

BA-CS:  BA(p & q) → (∼BAp → BAq)
BA-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BAp ↔ BAq.
10 For example, see [21].
11 For example, see “The Restricted Complement Thesis” in [3].
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We add these semantic constraints on any world, i, and proposition, X, for X ⊆ W, in a
model:
BA-t: If X ∈ BAi then i ∈ X
BA-c: If X ∈ BAi & Y ∈ BAi then X ∩ Y ∈ BAi
BA-no: W /∈ BAi
BA-cs: If X ∩ Y ∈ BAi then X ∈ BAi or Y ∈ BAi.
Call the result of adding our earlier system, KTd , to this one, “TECNOCS-KTd”.
It is important to keep some things in mind later on. “BA” is meant to have a strong
agential reading throughout. For example, RM (and thus necessitation) for BA fails: logical
truths are not brought about by anything our agent now does on the above account. Also,
although ∼BA
 holds, this does not mean that I can’t bring about a conjunction with 
 as a
conjunct. On the contrary, if I bring about any p, I will have thereby brought about (p & 
).
BA-T expresses the success condition for agency, BA-C indicates that if an agent now
brings about each of two things, then that agent now brings about both. BA-RE indicates
that an agent always brings about anything logically equivalent to what she brings about.
BA-CS deserves separate comment. “Conjunctive Syllogism” for BA says that if I bring
about the conjunction of two propositions, but not one of the conjuncts, then I bring about
the other conjunct. This sounds right.12 It would seem that if I do bring about a conjunction,
but not (say) its first conjunct, then that is because that conjunct is rendered true indepen-
dently of my agency.13 But then the only way the truth of the conjunction could result from
my agency is if the truth of the other conjunct results from it. Although it is not validated
(or considered) in [9,10,18,24,25], it nonetheless seems quite plausible. So I will include it
here.14
As noted, the above approach to “BA” is inspired by Elgesem, who rejects BA-K,
BA-K: BA(p → q) → (BAp → BAq),
which would be validated by
BA-k: If (X ∪ Y) ∈ BAi & − X ∈ BAi then Y ∈ BAi.
In rejecting BA-K [9, p. 83], Elgesem follows an argument from [28]. I have doubts about
the argument. However, some accounts of agency operators validate K, others don’t.15
There is no agreement here. In a few of the initial places where BA-K would have impact,
I note this in the footnotes.
12 It is valid for the astit, cstit and dstit operators. See [3].
13 This suggests the possibility, passed over here, of deriving BA-CS in a suitably stronger system from mixed
principles: BA(p & q) & ∼BAp ·→ PRp; BA(p & q) & PRp ·→ BAq. However, I ignore possible BA-PR bridge
axioms here, in part because principles such as BA(p & q) & ∼BAp ·→ PRp or BAp → CO∼p, which have
valid dstit and astit analogs, seem quite contentious to me. This is one reason why I think exploring these thinner
agency structures inspired by Elgesem is worthwhile. I hope to discuss problems with the dstit and astit approach
to agency elsewhere. See [13] for an excellent recent critical exposition of approaches to agency.
14 I ignore various plausible BA-principles that involve embedding occurrences of BA within the scope of BA.
15 For example, it is valid for the cstit and dstit operators, but not for the astit operator. See [3].
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We introduce an operator for ability:ABp: It is within John Doe’s ABility that p,
ABp =
df
COBAp.
The derivative truth-condition is:
M |=i ABp iff ∃j(COij & M |=j BAp).
It is within our agent’s ability that p at i iff there is a world consistent with our agent’s
i-based abilities where our agent brings p about.
The following are derivable in TECNOCS-KT:16
BA-OD:  ∼BA⊥
BA-NC:  BAp → ∼BA ∼ p
BA-CS′:  BA(p & q) → (BAp ∨ BAq)
BA-CS′′:  BAp →· ∼BA(p ∨ q) → BA(p ∨ ∼q)17
CO-T:  p → COp
N-CO:  CO

BA-CO:  BAp → COp
AB-NO:  ∼AB

AB-OD:  ∼AB⊥
BA-AB:  BAp → ABp
AB-RE: If  p ↔ q then  ABp ↔ ABq.
Finally, we introduce one more agential notion:
ARp: It is agentially reflective on John Doe that p,
ARp =
df
COp & PR(p → BAp).
It is Agentially Reflective on John Doe that p iff p is consistent with Doe’s abilities and it is
predetermined that: p is true only if Doe brings it about that p. The following are derivable:
 ARp ↔ (ABp & PR(p ↔ BAp))
 ∼AR

If  p → q then  ARq → (BAp → BAq) [ARQ-RM].
That’s it for the APA framework.18
16 With BA-K, we would also get the following: BA(p ∨ q) & BA¬p ·→ BAq, BAp & BA(p → q) ·→
BA(p & q), and CO(BAp & BA(p → q)) → ABq.
17 BA(p & p) ↔ BA((p ∨ q) & (p ∨ ∼q)). So BAp →· ∼BA(p ∨ q) → BA(p ∨ ∼q).
18 See [21] for a bit more detail on this module.
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1.5. Agential obligation in our reductive frameworkLet’s explore the implications of coupling our account of personal obligation with our
account of agency. We will be especially interested in examining the impact the non-
normality of “BA” has on the compounding of “OB” with “BA” to get agential obligation.
We introduce an operator for agential obligation:
AOp: it is agentially obligatory for John Doe that p.
We define it with:
AOp =
df
OBBAp [Df-AO].
The derivative defining equivalence is:
 AOp ↔ PR(d → BAp).
We offer “AOp” so defined as a tentative analysis of ordinary assertions of the sort:
“it is obligatory for John Doe to bring it about that p”.
As Krogh and Herrestad suggest, this strategy holds some promise of avoiding some of
the problems that occur as a result of analyzing agential obligation as a combination of an
impersonal obligation operator with an agential operator.19
So what logical connections do agential obligations have to personal obligations,
agency, ability and inevitability according to the current framework? First of all, AOp is
not normal. Some of the most salient principles governing “OB” for SDL fail for “AO”:
AO(p → q) → (AOp → AOq) [AO-K]
AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq) [AO-M]
If  p → q then  AOp → AOq [AO-RM]
If  p then  AOp [AO-NEC].
There are no valid wffs or theorems of the form BAp. Given BA-T and BA-RE, such a the-
orem would entail BA
, which conflicts with BA-NO—and we are assuming consistency
for that system.
Also notice that, although
OBd [OBd],
plainly holds, its AO-analogue,
AOd [AOd],
does not hold. Although it is predetermined that if the demands on John Doe are all met,
then they are all met, it is not predetermined that if they are all met, then Doe, himself,
brings it about that they are all met.
19 For example Carmo’s leakage problem [19, pp. 138–139] is plugged by this approach, but this is essentially
a multi-agent problem, so we do not consider it here.
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Although OB
 is a theorem, its antithesis for AO holds:20 ∼AO
 [AO-NO].
Proof. Given BA-NO,  ∼BA
, OB-NEC yields  OB∼BA
. But from OB-NC,
 OBBA
 → ∼OB∼BA
. So  ∼OBBA
. 
An aggregation principle holds:
 (AOp & AOq) → AO(p & q). [AO-C].
Proof. Assume OBBAp & OBBAq. By OB-C, OB(BAp & BAq). But BA-M holds:
 BAp & BAq. → BA(p & q). So by OB-RM, OBBA(p & q). 
An RE rule is also derivable:
If  p ↔ q then  AOp ↔ AOq [RE-AO].
As a special case of OB-NC, we obviously get:
 AOp → ∼OB∼BAp [NC′-AO].
But ∼OB∼BAp is not the dual of AOp. The dual of AOp is ∼AO∼p, i.e., ∼OBBA∼p. So
NC′-AO is not a standard No-Conflicts principle for AO. Rather, this is:
 AOp → ∼AO∼p [AO-NC].
Proof. Assume PR(d → BAp) and OBBA∼p. Then PR(d → BA∼p). So PR(d →
(BAp & BA∼p)). Since COd , CO(BAp & BA∼p). But by BA-T, | (BAp & BA∼p) →
(p & ∼p), and then CO(p & ∼p), contra  ∼CO⊥. 
No agential obligations to do the impossible are allowed:
 ∼AO⊥. [AO-D].
BA-CS yields:
 AO(p & q) → OB∼BAp → AOq.
Proof. Assume OBBA(p & q) and OB∼BAp. By OB-C, OB(BA(p & q) & ∼BAp). By
BA-CS,  BA(p & q) & ∼BAp ·→ BAq. So by OB-RM, AOq. 
Similarly for,
 AO(p & q) → OB(BAp ∨ BAq),
 AOp →· OB∼BA(p ∨ q) → AO(p ∨ ∼q).
20 Some proofs are included to give a sense of how the logic modules interact in generating derivative principles
for AO.
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However, as things now stand, the following AO-analog to BA-CS, call it “AO-Conjunctive
Syllogism”, is not a theorem of TECNOCS-KTd:
AO(p & q) & ∼AOp ·→ AOq [AO-CS].21
Neither is it valid given our semantics. For consider the following countermodel, M.
W = {i, j,k, l}, CO = W × W, ‖p‖M = {i, j,k}, ‖q‖M = {i, j, l},
‖d‖M = {i, j}, BAi = {‖p‖M ∩ ‖q‖M,‖p‖M}, BAj = {‖p‖M ∩ ‖q‖M,‖q‖M},
BAk = BAi =∅.
Here, all the axioms and rules of TECNOCS-KTd are satisfied, as are all our semantic
constraints, but not AO-CS. Although in any world where I bring it about that p & q, I
do bring about p or bring about q (i.e., BA-CS is satisfied), nonetheless, even though in
each ideal world I bring about the conjunction of p and q, in one I bring about p, but do
not bring about q, and in the other I bring about q, but do not bring about p. So it is not
obligatory to bring about either one in particular. Nothing so far rules this out, yet AO-
CS is worth considering as a candidate axiom. I have not been able to think of a fully
convincing intuitive counterexample. The best I have been able to do is to consider a case
where, say, a mindless machine will, by a truly random device, either press button one or
press button two, but not both. Let p = button one is pressed (by someone or thing), and
q = button two is pressed (by someone or thing). Let’s suppose that I am obligated to bring
about whichever button-pressing the machine does not cause. Since it is indeterminate as
to which button the machine will “choose”, I am neither obligated to bring about p nor
obligated to bring about q. Questions: Is the obligation for me to bring about whatever the
machine doesn’t one I can fulfill, and supposing it is, if I comply with this obligation, have
I brought about the conjunction of p & q in doing so?
Call the addition of this BA-CS analog to TECNOCS-KTd, “TECNOCS-Ktd+”. The
following constraint validates AO-CS:
AO-cs: If COi ∩ DEM ⊆ BA(X ∩ Y) then either COi ∩ DEM ⊆ BAX
or COi ∩ DEM ⊆ BAY,
where COi = {j: COij}, the set of i-ability-consistent world, and BAZ = {i: Z ∈ BAi}, the
proposition that our agent brings proposition Z about.
Analogs to BA-CS′ and BA-CS′′ follow in “TECNOCS-KTd+”:
 AO(p & q) → (AOp ∨ AOq) [AO-CS′],
 AOp →· ∼AO(p ∨ q) → AO(p ∨ ∼q) [AO-CS′′].
Unless otherwise specified, we will focus on just TECNOCS-KTd and its semantics.
It is also the case that what is agentially obligatory is personally obligatory:
 AOp → OBp [AO-OB].
The converse fails, as we should hope.
21 Its OB analog, OB(p & q) →· ∼OBp → OBq, is of course derivable from OB-M.
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Although AO-K fails,22 a close cousin is derivable: AO(p → q) → (AOp → OBq) [Weak AO-K].
Proof. Assume PR(d → BA(p → q)) and PR(d → BAp). So PR(d → (BA(p → q)
& BAp). By BA-T, it follows that  BA(p → q) & BAp ·→ q, and then by PR-NEC,
we get PR(BA(p → q) & BAp ·→ q). So PR(d → q). 
Although
 PR(p → q) → (OBp → OBq) [OB-RM′]
obviously holds, its AO analogue fails:
PR(p → q) → (AOp → AOq).
However, a weaker cousin holds:
 PR(p → q) → (AOp → OBq) [Weak AO-RM′].
Similarly, although AO-RM fails, this cousin holds:
If  p → q then  AOp → OBq [Weak AO-RM].
As is well-known, for a KTd system, a version of Kant’s Law for OB holds
 OBp → COp [KL],
and this carries over to AO as well as a special case,
 AOp → ABp [AO-AB].
So, what is agentially obligatory is within the ability of the agent.
Some additional miscellaneous principles follow:
 AOp → OBABp.
 AOp ↔ AO(p & 
)
 AO(p & 
) → (AOp & ∼AO
)
If  q then  AO(p & q) → (AOp & OB∼BAq).
Proof. Assume  q. The BA analogue for this rule holds: if  q, then  BA(p & q) →
(BAp & ∼BAq). So  BA(p & q) → (BAp & ∼BAq). But then by OB-RM,
 OBBA(p & q) → OB(BAp & ∼BAq). But by OB-M,  OB(BAp & ∼BAq) →
(OBBAp & OB∼BAq). So  AO(p & q) → (AOp & OB∼BAq). 
22 However, given BA-K, AO(p → q) → (AOp → AOq), that is AO-K, is derivable with the help of OB-C and
OB-RM.
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Here are some expected (though contentious) connections between predetermination
and obligation:
 PRp → OBp [PR-OB],
 PRBAp → AOp.
In passing, what happens if we add an analogue to determinism,  p → PRp, to our system?
Well, in well-known ways, predetermination for John Doe and consistency with John Doe’s
abilities will both collapse into truth:
If  (p → PRp) then  (p ↔ PRp),
If  (p → PRp) then  (COp ↔ p).
We then easily get these derivative analogues to hard determinism regarding personal and
agential obligations:
If  (p → PRp) then  (OBp ↔ p),
If  (p → PRp) then  (AOp ↔ BAp).
Recall ARp =
df
COp & PR(p → BAp). Although we have identified a number of invalid
principles above, in many cases, agentially reflective qualified versions of them are valid.
This tends to confirm the observation in [21] that this agency notion is of interest.23 How-
ever, below, it is primarily the “only me if anyone” second clause in the definition of AR
that does the work. So let’s define an “only me” operator for this component,
OMp =
df
PR(p → BAp),
and employ it, noting the corollaries regarding AR.
 OMp → (OBp → AOp) [OM-Qualified OB-AO].
Corollary.  ARp → (OBp → AOp).
This says that if it is obligatory for me that p be the case and it is inevitable that p will
occur only if I bring it about, then it is obligatory for me that I bring it about.
 OMq → (PR(p → q) → (AOp → AOq)) [OM-Qualified OA-RM′].
Corollary.  ARq → (PR(p → q) → (AOp → AOq).
If  p → q then  OMq → (AOp → AOq) [OM-Qualified AO-RM].
Corollary. If  p → q then  ARq → (AOp → AOq).
23 It should not be surprising that in a context that distinguishes personal from agential obligations, the notion
of things that can hold only if I bring them about myself would have special significance.
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 OMp & AO(p & q) → AOp.
 (OMp & OMq) → (AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq)) [OM-Qualified AO-M].
Corollary.  (ARp & ARq) → (AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq)).
Note that
OM(p & q) → (AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq))
is not a theorem. This OM-Qualified version of AO-C fails for the reasons that OM(p & q)
→ OMp fails, which, in turn, ultimately hinges on the failure of BA(p & q) → BAp. Just
let p be 
: even if I am obligated to bring about the conjunction, I am not obligated to
bring about an independently settled conjunct.
An OM-qualified version of K follows as well:24
 OMq → (AO(p → q) → (AOp → AOq)) [OM-Qualified AO-K].
Corollary.  AO(p → q) → (ARq → (AOp → AOq)).
1.6. The pure agential obligation fragment of TECNOCS-KTd
What is the logic of the compound operator, AO, in isolation? Consider the “pure” AO
principles we derived in TECNOCS-KTd.25 There were just these:
 AOp → ∼AO∼p [AO-NC]
 (AOp & AOq) → AO(p & q). [AO-C]
 ∼AO
 [AO-NO]
 ∼AO⊥ [AO-D]
If  p ↔ q then  AOp ↔ AOq [AO-RE].
Given AO-C and AO-RE, AO-NC follows from AO-D (but not vice versa, as we will see).
So let us zero in on the following system, call it “DEC-NO”:
SL: All Tautologies
AO-D:  ∼AO⊥
AO-C:  (AOp & AOq) → AO(p & q)
AO-NO:  ∼AO

MP:  If  p and  p → q then  q
AO-RE: If  p ↔ q then  AOp ↔ AOq.
24 From Weak AO-K and OM-Qualified OB-AO.
25 If we had BA-K, then we would need to add AO-K and make adjustments in what is said here accordingly.
132 P. McNamara / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 117–152
Notice that this classical AO-logic is a proper sub-logic of our BA logic. For the only
difference in the axiom systems other than “AO” versus “BA” is that only TEC-NO has
BA-T and BA-CS as axioms and only DEC-NO has ∼AO⊥ as an axiom. But ∼BA⊥ is
plainly derivable from BA-T and SL, but as can be easily shown (e.g., using the semantics
below), AO-T is not derivable in DEC-NO.
Comparing DEC-NO for AO to SDL for OB, the only base principle in DEC-NO that
has no analogue in SDL is the axiom AO-NO. On the other hand, although OB-NC of SDL
has an analogue (as a theorem) in DEC-NO, neither of the AO-analogues of OB-K and
OB-NEC are theorems of DEC-NO.
Recall AO-CS from TECNOCS-KTd+:
 AO(p & q) & ∼AOp ·→ AOq.
This is also a pure-AO principle that we tentatively considered. If we add AO-CS to DEC-
NO, we get “DECNOCS”.
Representing agential obligation for the moment with a primitive operator, we can give
a direct standard minimal models semantics for these two classic AO-systems in the usual
way:
AO : W → Pow(Pow(W)), i.e., AOi ⊆ Pow(W)
M |=i AOp iff ‖p‖M ∈ AOi.
We then introduce the following constraints to validate AO-D, AO-C AO-NO, and AO-CS
respectively:
∅ /∈ AOi
If X ∈ AOi and Y ∈ AOi then X ∩ Y ∈ AOi
W /∈ AOi.
If X ∩ Y ∈ AOi then either X ∈ AOi or Y ∈ AOi .
We can now also see that given AO-RE and AO-C, although AO-NC is derivable in
TECNOCS-KTd from AO-D, the converse does not hold, for just consider a simple model
where the only member of AOi is the empty set. RE, AO-NC and AO-C all hold, but not
AO-D. So AO-D is stronger than AO-NC even though OB-D and OB-NC are interchange-
able for our SDL and KTd systems.
Conjecture 1. DEC-NO (DECNOCS) is determined by the class of all minimal models
satisfying the above three (four) constraints.
Conjecture 2. DEC-NO (DECNOCS) is the pure AO-fragment of TECNOCS-KTd
(TECNOCS-KTd+). (This claim can be made more precise following [1,2], and I suspect it
can be proved in a similar fashion, which would depend on first proving Conjecture 1.)
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2. Agential obligation with weaker deontic bases2.1. Weakening the SDL base for OB
As noted earlier, we engaged in a fair amount of idealization above. We now wish to
discharge some of that in order to get a better account of personal obligations, and thereby
a better derivative account of agential obligations.
Recall that in system PR-Kd , we defined “OB” as follows:
OBp =
df
PR(d → p) [Df-OB].
And stipulated this axiom:
d : COd (i.e., ∼PR∼d).
Among other things, this generated SDL for OB:
SL: All Tautologies
OB-NC: OBp → ∼OB∼p
OB-K: OB(p → q) → (OBp → OBq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
OB-NEC: If  p then  OBq.
Now it certainly seems that there are some objectionable things about this account of per-
sonal obligation.
Perhaps first and foremost, is the assumption, COd , that it is a logical truth that all of the
demands on John Doe can be met. At the level of SDL, this (and Df-OB) generates OB-NC,
asserting that it is a logical truth that John Doe never has conflicting personal obligations.
Both of these claims seem to be false, and we will be especially interested in the impact of
discharging these assumptions. Once we reject the logical necessity of COd , it is not clear
that there is any significant role left at all for d to play. Without COd , if we define OBp as
PR(d → p), then in all situations where it is predetermined that the demands on John Doe
cannot all be met (i.e., PR∼d), it follows that absolutely everything is obligatory. But this
is surely not right. So we must reject the Andersonian–Kangerian reduction if we want to
allow for non-empty sets of obligations that can’t be jointly realized in situations where
this is not because everything is obligatory. We will see toward the end that there may still
be a role for d in a conflict-allowing context, but it will be restorative, not reductive. For
now, let’s set d aside and focus on SDL independently of its deducibility from Kd .
We will want to weaken SDL by rejecting OB-NC. However, as is usual in conflict-
allowing treatments, we do not want to thereby reject the distinct and plausible claim that
there are no personal obligations to do logically impossible things. So we will replace
OB-NC with:
∼OB⊥. [OB-D].
Since we will be considering classical non-normal systems for OB, we will employ min-
imal models. With that in mind, we introduce a function, OB, from worlds to sets of
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propositions:OB : W → Pow(Pow(W)), i.e., OBi ⊆ Pow(W).
For a given world, OBi yields a set of propositions (possibly empty) that are obligatory for
John Doe at that world. We then model a claim that it is obligatory for John Doe that p
accordingly:
M |=i OBp iff ‖p‖M ∈ OBi.
We can ratify OB-D by constraining models accordingly:
OB-d: ∅ /∈ OBi.
As will be seen, by allowing for conflicts of personal obligation, we will thereby deriva-
tively allow for conflicts of agential obligation. In fact, this is the main goal here. However,
a few remarks are in order about the remaining deontic principles for OB, as we will
consider a sequence of successively stronger OB-systems and sketch their impact on AO
(defined as OBBA).
Let me begin with OB-NEC. This appears to be objectionable on two counts. First, it
implies that it is obligatory for John Doe that it is raining or not raining, and similarly for
all logical truths. A bit of the sting can perhaps be taken out of this by noting that personal
obligation is not agential obligation. For the personal obligation reading of “OB” is “it is
obligatory for an individual that p be the case”, and not that that individual make p be the
case. Now any basic obligation that p is the case can be met only if all p’s consequences are
derivatively met. So it might be suggested that although logical truths are merely logically
derivative obligations that are practically not worth stating ordinarily (and thus pragmati-
cally odd to state), their being the case is nonetheless obligatory for an individual. They are
the limiting case of things rendered obligatory consequential upon more basic obligations,
obligations that are worth stating. But even granting the spirit of this weak defense of OB-
NEC for sake of argument, there is still a second objection: namely that a consequence of
OB-NEC is that it is a logical truth that some things are obligatory for John Doe. Even if
we grant that things can be derivatively obligatory, right up to logical truths, that wouldn’t
yet imply that there must always be such obligatory things, for there might be situations
where John Doe has no basic obligations from which to generate such derivative obliga-
tory things. For example, if John Doe is alone on a desert island, with no hope of rescue,
he might eventually be under no obligations.
In this respect, OB-RM looks less unattractive than OB-NEC:
If  p → q then  OBp → OBq [OB-RM].
Relatedly, consider principle M,
OB(p & q) → (OBp & OBq) [OB-M].
This says that if a conjunction is obligatory for John Doe, then so is each conjunct. Al-
though this is plainly problematic for an agential reading, it seems less problematic for the
non-agential personal reading we are giving, but once again, given OB-RE, it entails that
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OB
 is possible. As is well known,
OB-RE + OB-M and OB-RM are interderivable [7, p. 236].
We will rely on this fact implicitly throughout.
Both OB-M and OB-RM are validated by either of the following equivalent conditions
[7, p. 215]:
OB-m: If X ∩ Y ∈ OBi, then so is X
OB-rm: If X ⊆ Y then if X ∈ OBi then Y ∈ OBi.
RM and M are certainly controversial. However, the main aim here is to highlight the way
in which the constraints we have already placed on agency impact the compounding of
agency with a personal obligation operator that allows for conflicts. So we will include
classical systems that contain OB-RM/OB-M. The main OB elements we change here bear
on conflicts per se. We postpone to another time the exploration of systems with more
plausible and thus restricted versions of RM and M.
What of OB-K?
OB(p → q) → (OBp → OBq) [OB-K]
Although we might argue against AO-K, by arguing against BA-K, at first blush at least, a K
principle for personal obligation seems plausible. We will return to the apparent plausibility
of OB-K again in a moment.
Consider C:
(OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q) [OB-C].
We must reject K in any systems strong enough to generate RM, for: in the context of RM,
C and K are equivalent:
Given RM, K iff  C.
But why do we reject OB-C in the first place? Well the most obvious reason is that it yields
a special version of OB-C, which I will call “OB-CD” (since it combines features of C
and D):
OBp & OB∼p → OB(p & ∼p) [OB-CD].
This says that whenever I have directly conflicting obligations, the logical contradiction
formed by their conjunction is also obligatory for me. Clearly, we must reject OB-C if
we are to both allow for conflicts of obligation but rule out obligations that logically im-
possible things obtain. Many have thought that a contradiction can never be obligatory
for anyone. Even if a contradiction could somehow be obligatory for someone (Romeo
solemnly promises Juliet that he will square the circle), such an obligation wouldn’t follow
from the mere fact that I had a directly conflicting set of obligations. So it seems OB-CD
should be blocked no matter what.
But more can be said against it. Consider a related formula, call it the “Fatal Formula”
for a logic of conflicts:
(OBp & OB∼p) → OBq [OB-FF].
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This says that in the presence of a single direct conflict, every proposition is obligatory,
and thus all OB-distinctions between formulas disappear.
Now any SL-inclusive system with OB-RM and OB-CD allows us to conclude FF:
OB-RM + OB-CD  OB-FF.
Proof. Assume OB-RM+OB-CD and OBp & OB∼p. By OB-CD, we have OB(p & ∼p).
But since  (p & ∼p) → q, by OB-RM, we get OBq. 
Corollary. OB-RE + M + OB-CD, OB-FF.
So any Classical System with OB-M must avoid OB-CD at all costs. We will revisit
OB-CD.
Since we need OB-RM to derive OB-C from OB-K, and RM (and M) are contentious,
this suggests the option of keeping OB-K, and dropping OB-RM while retaining the rela-
tively innocuous OB-RE. Some have thought OB-K, even in conflict contexts is not only
acceptable, but compelling. Indeed, I also thought so when I began this project, and I
was temporarily stymied because I felt it needed to be rejected, yet I couldn’t see how to
motivate its rejection intuitively. How could it be obligatory for me that if p then q, and
obligatory for me that p, yet not be obligatory for me that q? As Horty put it, in discussing
a classical system with just OB-RE and OB-M,
. . . in weakening standard deontic logic to allow conflicts, it seems that we have now
arrived at a system that is too weak: it fails to validate intuitively desirable inferences.
Suppose for example that an agent is subject to the following two norms, you ought
either to fight in the army or perform alternative service, you ought not to fight in the
army.
We can represent these norms through the formulas O(F ∨ S) and O∼F. Now it seems
intuitively that the agent should conclude from these premises that he ought to perform
alternative service. However, the inference from O(F ∨ S) and O∼F to OS is not valid
in the logic EM. [16, p. 21].
Plainly, the principle behind the inference in question is OB-K in disguise (i.e.,
OB(∼F → S) → (OB∼F → OBS). Unfortunately, despite OB-K’s initially plausible ring,
it is quite unacceptable on reflection, since it entails the validity of OB-CD as a special
case in all classical systems, and thus even without OB-M/RM:
Given OB-RE, if  OB-K then  OB-CD.
Proof. By SL,  ∼p ↔ (p → (p & ∼p)). So by RE, OB∼p ↔ OB(p → (p & ∼p)). By K,
OB(p → (p & ∼p)) →· OBp → OB(p & ∼p). So OB∼p →· OBp → OB(p & ∼p), i.e.,
(OBp & OB∼p) → OB(p & ∼p). 
Seen semantically, OB-K amounts to this:
If −X ∪ Y ∈ OBi & X ∈ OBi then Y ∈ OBi.
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But this implies the following special case:If −X ∪∅ ∈ OBi & X ∈ OBi then ∅ ∈ OBi.
Since −X ∪∅= −X, and X ∩ −X =∅, this is equivalent to:
If −X ∈ OBi & X ∈ OBi then X ∩ −X ∈ OBi,
which is just a natural expression of OB-CD’s truth-condition.
So although K + RE does not entail C or FF (M is needed for these), it only takes
maximally plausible RE, to derive CD from K. So OB-K is not acceptable at all. When we
see it as plausible, it is because we naturally think of the wffs, “p → q” and “p”, governed
by the first two “OB”s in OB-K as mutually consistent, as in Horty’s example where we
assume not fighting and alternative service are jointly satisfiable. But this need not be so, as
the instance in the proof above makes clear. There we saw that K automatically generates a
contradictory obligation from a pair of feebly disguised conflicting obligations, using only
OB-RE. So OB-K is a maximally implausible principle for conflict-allowing contexts, and
far more problematic than RM.
Now note that we have modal operators that allow for the expression of conditions
sufficient for logical consistency. With that in mind, consider two weakened versions of C
and K:
CO(p & q) →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q) [OB-C′],
CO(p & q) →· OB(p → q) → (OBp → OBq) [OB-K′].26
Since we saw above that OB-C and OB-K are equivalent in logics with OB-RE & OB-M,
we get:
Corollary. Given OB-RE and OB-M,  C′ ↔ K′.
OB-C′ is plausible. The only reason we seem to have for blocking full-fledged OB-C
is to prevent cases where a pair of things individually obligatory for me cannot be jointly
met–they conflict. So if a pair of propositions are individually obligatory for me, and it is
consistent with my abilities that the pair jointly occur, then there is no conflict involved
in their joint occurrence, and so nothing to prevent its being obligatory for me that they
jointly occur, or so it would seem. We will explore this qualified version of OB-C, and ask
later if it is qualification enough.
We can validate OB-C′ and OB-K′ by either of the following equivalent conditions:
OB-c′: If X ∩ Y ∈ COi & X,Y are in OBi then X ∩ Y ∈ OBi,
OB-k′: If X ∩ Y ∈ COi,∼X ∪ Y ∈ OBi, and X ∈ OBi, then Y ∈ OBi,
where COi = {X: X∩{j : COij} =∅}, the propositions consistent with our agent’s abilities
at i.
26 Since  [(p → q) & p] ↔ (p & q), OB-K′ is equivalent to CO[(p → q) & p] →· OB(p → q) → (OBp →
OBq).
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So I suggest that we first briefly consider the impact on AO of splicing the following
basic classical systems for personal obligation to our agential-predetermination systems.
The basic system is OB-E:
SL: All Tautologies
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
OB-RE: If  p ↔ q then  OBp ↔ OBq.
We can then turn to the impact on AO of the result of adding OB-D, to get system ED, and
then OB-M to get the still stronger system, MED.27 Let’s see how these weaker conflict-
allowing logics interact first with our logic for BA, especially with an eye on AO. Then we
can go on to weave principles involving the CO and PR operators back in, tweaking the
logics a bit when we do so in order to get more integrated PR-inclusive systems. Then we
will briefly consider the possible role of a deontic constant like “d”. Finally, we will return
to OB-C′.
2.2. Agential obligation again
Imagine that we conjoin the E system for OB with our BA system, TECNOCS (enrich-
ing the language in obvious ways). Call the result E-TECNOCS:
SL: All Tautologies
BA-T: BAp → p
BA-C: (BAp & BAq) → BA(p & q)
BA-CS: BA(p & q) → (∼BAp → BAq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
BA-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BAp ↔ BAq
OB-RE: If  p ↔ q then  OBp ↔ OBq.
Similarly, by adding OB-D to the above system, we get ED-TECNOCS, and by then adding
OB-M to that system, we get MED-TECNOCS.
We define “AO” as before, but consider it tied to our new account of “OB”:
AOp =
df
OBBAp [Df-OB].
Obviously the first sub-logic E, for OB is much weaker than SDL (and hence Kd). Using
our prior work on AO in the Kd/SDL setting as a guide, what if anything is left over by
way of theorems? Not much. OB-RE alone generates AO-RE, given Df-AO:
If  p ↔ q then  AOp ↔ AOq [AO-RE].
Now consider some results of adding OB-D to get ED-TECHNO:
 ∼AO⊥. [AO-D].
27 Cf. MED to the weakest system for “O” proposed in [7, Chapter 6].
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Proof.  ∼BA⊥. So,  BA⊥ ↔ ⊥. So by OB-RE,  OBBA⊥ ↔ OB⊥. But by OB-D,
 ∼OB⊥. So  ∼OBBA⊥, i.e.,  ∼AO⊥. 
 ∼AO
 [AO-NO].
 AO(p & 
) → (AOp & ∼AO
).
Note that although OB-NO is not a theorem, nor is it valid (on the associated semantics),
its agential analogue, AO-NO, is a theorem and is valid. Similarly for the last theorem.
Although adding M to ED-TECNOCS boosts its strength significantly, the result still
falls far short of adding SDL to TECHNOCS. Much of what was derivable for AO in
the fairly strong Andersonian–Kangerian framework is no longer derivable, nor valid. For
example, these all fail:
AO(p → q) → (AOp → OBq) [Weak AO-K],
AOp → ∼OB∼BAp [NC′-AO],
AOp → ∼AO∼p [i.e., OBBAp → ∼OBBA∼p] [AO-NC].
Similarly, the following principles are not derivable and are invalid even though their OB-
analogues are derivable and valid:
AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq) [AO-M]
AOp → AO(p ∨ q) [Ross Paradox]
If  p → q then  AOp → AOq [AO-RM].
Consider the latter. Suppose OBBAp holds at i. For any p,  p → 
. Now BA
 fails at
all worlds in all models, so ‖BA
‖M = ∅ in all models. But then by OB-d and the truth
clause for “OB”, OBBA
 fails at all worlds in all models.
In fact, the only AO-pure principles we noted are those we saw in Part I other than AO-C
and AO-CS, namely:
If  p ↔ q then  AOp ↔ AOq [AO-RE]
 ∼AO⊥. [AO-D]
 ∼AO
 [AO-NO]
 AO(p & 
) → (AOp & ∼AO
).
The latter is easily derivable from the first two, so it looks like the pure AO-system we
get might be DE-NO, a sublogic of DEC-NO discussed in our earlier section, “The Pure
Agential Obligation Fragment of TECNOCS-KTd”. The only missing pure AO-principle
from that system is AO-C. A minimal model semantics and conjectures like those in the
earlier section are easily adapted. Were we to add AO-CS (recall TECNOCS-KTd+),
AO(p & q) →· ∼AOp → AOq,
given the new semantics for OB, we would need to validate it with this constraint:
If BA(X ∩ Y) ∈ OBi then either BAX ∈ OBi or BAY ∈ OBi .
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As before, the following are still easily derived: AO(p & q) → (AOp ∨ AOq) [AO-CS′],
 AOp →· ∼AO(p ∨ q) → AO(p ∨ ∼q) [AO-CS′′].
Set AO-CS aside henceforth.
What positive links are there between OB and AO in the setting of MED-TECNOCS?
Well, that something is obligatory for me does not imply that I am obligated to bring it
about, but the converse, that what is obligatory for me to bring about is obligatory for me
is provable:
 AOp → OBp [AO-OB].
Although AO-M is invalid, OB-M does generate a weak AO-M analogue:
 OB(BAp & BAq) → (AOp & AOq) [Weak AO-M].
Let’s note one important principle:
 OB(BAp & BAq) → AO(p & q) [OB-AO C].
Here are a few more derivable principles:
If  p → q then  AOp → OBq [Weak AO-RM]
 AOp → OB
 (From AO-OB and OB-RM)
If  q then  AO(p & q) → (AOp & OB∼BAq)
 AOp → OB∼BA∼p (From BA-NC and OB-RM).
We also get some cousins of K:
 OB(BA(p → q) & BAp) → OBq).
 OB(BA(p → q) & BAp) →· AO(p → q) & AOp & OBq.
Also, we have:
 AO(p → q) → OB(BAp → q).
Now we need to explore possible links between PR, our notion of predetermination, and
OB and AO. If we just graft on our KT system for PR to MED-TECNOCS, we get MED-
TECNOCS-KT:
SL: All Tautologies
BA-T: BAp → p
BA-C: (BAp & BAq) → BA(p & q)
BA-CS: BA(p & q) → (∼BAp → BAq)
PR-T: PRp → p
PR-K: PR(p → q) → (PRp → PRq)
OB-D: ∼OB⊥
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OB-M: OB(p & q) → (OBp & OBq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
BA-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BAp ↔ BAq
PR-NEC: If  p then  PRq
OB-RE: If  p ↔ q then  OBp ↔ OBq.
These prior principles of the strong Kd system no longer hold:
PRp → OBp
OBp → (PRq → OBq).
PR(p → q) → (AOp → OBq)
PRBAp → AOp
AO(p → q) →· ARq → (AOp → AOq)
If  p → PRp then  BAp → AOp.
Here are two other prior theorems:
OBp → COp [KL (for “Kant’s Law”)],
AOp → ABp.
The latter is just a special case of the former. I think these are contentious principles, since
an at least plausible argument that they are false can be made. Raising doubts about the
latter principle will suffice. Suppose I have promised you to be at a meeting at noon, and
thereby acquire an agential obligation to attend. Now add that my car breaks down on the
way, rendering me unable to make the meeting. In that case, it seems that my obligation
to be at the meeting at noon is unfulfillable. For example, can’t I say truly that “I have
to be at the meeting at noon, but there is just no way I can make it.”? Consider debts.
Many people have debts they are unable to pay. Surely some of these cases are cases where
the person has an obligation to pay some money to someone that they can’t pay. So to
accept AOp → ABp (or OBp → COp) appears to amount to denying that there can be
unfulfillable obligations. But the adjective appears to go with the noun seamlessly enough.
No contradiction is apparent. How can this be so if the above principles are true? These
principles are at least contentious, and they are neither valid nor derivable. We will return
to them later. To validate them we would need to add the following semantic constraints,
respectively (though the first entails the second),
If X ∈ OBi then X ∈ COi,
If BAX ∈ OBi then BAX ∈ COi .
Are there any positive links? The following do hold:
 AOp → OBCOp,
 AOp → OBABp.
Conjoined with the two prior non-validities, the position is that although being obligated
to bring about p does not entail that p is consistent with, much less within my abilities, it
does entail that it is obligatory that p is both consistent with and within my abilities.
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At this point, let’s add in OB-C′, CO(p & q) →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q) [OB-C′],
to get MEDC′-TECHNO-KT.
We have already noted that with OB-RE & OB-M, we can derive OB-K′:
 CO(p & q) →· OB(p → q) → (OBp → OBq) [OB-K′].
These yield the following AO-analogues:
 CO(BAp & BAq) →· (AOp & AOq) → OB(BAp & BAq) [Weak AO-C′],
 CO(BAp & BAq) →· OB(BAp → BAq) → (AOp → AOq) [Weak OB-K′].
Notice the latter and recall Horty’s “fight or do alternative service” example. First, we
assume tacitly that it is consistent with the agent’s abilities that he both brings it about that
he does not fight and brings it about that he does alternative service. Then, relying on this,
we infer that he must perform alternative service. For (1) it is obligatory for him to be such
that if he brings about his not fighting, then he performs alternative service, and (2) it is
obligatory for him to be such that he brings it about that he doesn’t fight. Notice also that it
is less plausible to say that the agent is obligated to bring it about that (as opposed to being
obligated to be such that) either he will fight or he will do alternative service, for that may
already be a deeply settled part of his character. Again, it looks like we are obligated to not
only do things, but to be certain ways, and the latter do not reduce to the former.
We also get the following from Weak AO-C′ and Weak AO-M:
 CO(BAp & BAq) →· OB(BAp & BAq) ↔ (AOp & AOq) [Weak AO-R′].
Similarly, we get an important AO-analogue to OB-C′:
 CO(BAp & BAq) →· (AOp & AOq) → AO(p & q) [AO-C′].
Proof. Assume CO(BAp & BAq). By Weak AO-C′, we get (AOp & AOq) → OB(BAp &
BAq). But by OB-AO C,  OB(BAp & BAq) → AO(p & q). So we get (AOp & AOq) →
AO(p & q) from our assumption. 
However this is neither derivable nor valid:
CO(BAp & BAq) →· AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq).
Suppose it is consistent with my abilities that I both bring it about that p and bring it about
that q. Now add that if I don’t bring about q, you will. It may then be obligatory for me
to bring about p after you have settled q instead of me. I will then be obligated to bring it
about that the conjunction of p and q holds by bringing about the remaining conjunct, p,
but it need not be obligatory for me to bring it about that q.
Other than OB-C′, we have no real bridging principles linking PR and OB. So let’s
briefly consider adding that inevitably equivalent propositions are jointly obligatory if at
all:
PR(p ↔ q) → (OBp ↔ OBq) [OB-E′].
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With OB-E′, we no longer need OB-RE as a basic principle. So let’s consider this system,
ME′DC′-TECNOCS-KT, briefly.
SL: All Tautologies
BA-T: BAp → p
BA-C: (BAp & BAq) → BA(p & q)
BA-CS: BA(p & q) → (∼BAp → BAq)
PR-T: PRp → p
PR-K: PR(p → q) → (PRp → PRq)
OB-D: ∼OB⊥
OB-M: OB(p & q) → (OBp & OBq)
OB-C′: CO(p & q) →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q)
OB-E′: PR(p ↔ q) → (OBp ↔ OBq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
BA-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BAp ↔ BAq
PR-NEC: If  p then  PRq.
The increased strength of E′ over OB-RE is impactive when we consider the analogues
to the earlier OM/AR qualified principles. Recall that, by BA-T and PR-RE, OMp (i.e.,
PR(p → BAp)) entails PR(p ↔ BAp). Now consider the first such important analogue:
 OMp → (OBp ↔ AOp) [OM-Qualified OB-AO].
Proof. Assume OMp. So by BA-T and PR-NEC, PR(p ↔ BAp). So by E′, OBp ↔
OBBAp. 
Corollary.  ARp → (OBp ↔ AOp).
In other words, under circumstances where it is predetermined that something will be
the case only if I bring it about, then that thing is personally obligatory for me iff it is agen-
tially obligatory for me. Consider some analogues to the other earlier Kd-based theorems
involving OM/AR:
 OMq → (PR(p → q) → (AOp → AOq)) [OM-Qualified RM′].
If  p → q then  OMq → (AOp → AOq) [OM-Qualified AO-RM].
Corollary. If  p → q then  ARq → (AOp → AOq).
Although AO-M is invalid, an OM-qualified version is valid:
 (OMp & OMq) →· AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq) [OM-Qualified AO-M]
Corollary.  (ARp & ARq) → (AO(p & q) → (AOp & AOq)).
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Let us consider one further, still stronger, bridge principle, that the inevitable conse-
quences of obligatory things are obligatory,
PR(p → q) → (OBp → OBq) [OB-RM′].
Notice that the following is then easily derivable:
OBp & ∼COp · → OBq.28
So if we add OB-RM′, we need to add our previously discussed
OBp → COp [KL]
in tandem. We assume that the principle what is necessitated for me by what is obligatory
is obligatory only makes sense in contexts where what is obligatory is consistent with my
abilities.
Call the resulting system KLC′RM′−TECNOCS-KT:
SL: All Tautologies
BA-T: BAp → p
BA-C: (BAp & BAq) → BA(p & q)
BA-CS: BA(p & q) → (∼BAp → BAq)
PR-T: PRp → p
PR-K: PR(p → q) → (PRp → PRq)
KL: OBp → COp
OB-C′: CO(p & q) →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q)
OB-RM′: PR(p → q) → (OBp → OBq)
MP: If  p and  p → q then  q
BA-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BAp ↔ BAq
PR-NEC: If  p then  PRq.
First note that the following are now all derivable:
 ∼OB⊥ [OB-D]
 AOp → ABp
 PR(p ↔ q) → (OBp ↔ OBq) [E′]
If  p ↔ q then OBp ↔ OBq [OB-RE]
If  p → q then  OBp → OBq [OB-RM]
 OB(p & q) → (OBp & OBq) [OB-M].
We also get these:
 PR(p → q) → (AOp → OBq),
 PR(BAp → BAq) → (AOp → AOq).
28 This no doubt reflects one of the difficulties in facing unfulfillable obligations.
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These have at least some attraction. Consider the last principle. Suppose I am obligated to
get myself to the meeting, and I can only do so if I also get myself to my car. Then I am
obligated to get myself to my car.
2.3. Andersonian–Kangerian constants again and some glimpses ahead
Although we had to reject the Andersonian–Kangerian reduction in order to model con-
flicting obligations, here we briefly explore reintroducing d into the language with its usual
informal reading:
d: The demands on John Doe are all met (or “John Doe’s responsibilities
are all met”).
Having this in our language facilitates being able to talk about situations where all our
obligations are met or can be met, and so situations where there are no conflicts of oblig-
ation at all. But since we have introduced an independent conflict-allowing notion of
obligation, d can now be thought of as a proposition asserting that all our obligations, as
already independently construed, have been met. Indeed, semantically, the classic depen-
dence we see in the Andersonian–Kangerian reduction will be reversed: d’s truth-condition
will be defined via our now independent notion of Doe’s obligations:
M |=i d iff i ∈
⋂
OBi, i.e., ∀X(X ∈ OBi → i ∈ X) [d].
This says d is true at a world iff all of our agent’s obligations at that world are jointly met
there. Plainly, d can’t be true where our obligations logically conflict, since that would
require a world where an inconsistent set of propositions holds. Consider the following
fundamental valid formula:
d → (OBp → p) [dOB Truth].
This says that if all of the demands on Doe are satisfied, then any particular obligation he
is under is satisfied.
Couched this way, our Andersonian–Kangerian constant can now be used in a restora-
tive rather than reductive way. We presumably want something at least as strong as:
If ‖d‖M ∈ OBi then
⋂
OBi =∅.
This says that if the proposition that all the demands on John Doe are met is itself one of
the obligatory things for John Doe at i then the propositions obligatory for John Doe at i
are jointly logically consistent. This yields the following valid rule:
If  p → ∼q then  OBd → (OBp → ∼OBq).
This in turn entails as a special case:
 OBd → (OBp → ∼OB∼p) [dOB-NC],
thus restoring our earlier no-conflicts principle in a qualified form.
Relatedly, the following stronger formula sounds plausible:
COd → OBd.
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It asserts that if it is merely consistent with my abilities that all the demands on me are
met, then one of the obligatory things for me is that all the demands on me are met. This
formula is validated by the following constraint:
If ‖d‖M ∈ COi then ‖d‖M ∈ OBi.29
This says that if at some world consistent with my abilities here, all the demands made
on me are met there, then meeting all the demands made on me is obligatory here.
This leads naturally to thinking about d in the context of intuitions about the transfer or
“traveling” of our obligations across the situations consistent with our abilities.30
Consider the claim that what is obligatory is settled obligatory:
OBp → PROBp.
This is validated by
∀j(COij → OBi ⊆ OBj ) [CO-OB Export].
CO-OB Export says that my obligations at this world “travel” (perhaps with additions) to
all worlds consistent with my abilities here. Intuitively it amounts to saying that it is not
consistent with my abilities that my obligations (now) contract. This would validate
COd →· (OBp & OBq) → CO(p & q)
as well. For suppose COd , OBp and OBq hold at i. Then for some j, such that COij, d
holds at j. But then by OB-CO Export, OBp and OBq must hold at that j as well. But then
by d’s truth-conditions, p and q must each hold at j. So there conjunction holds there, and
hence CO(p & q) must hold back at i.
Also, with the above formula, from OB − C′, CO(p & q) → · (OBp & OBq) →
OB(p & q), we get a new qualified version on OB-C:
COd →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q),
along with a semantic analog to OB-c′, if X∩Y ∈ COi & X,Y are in OBi then X∩Y ∈ OBi ,
namely,
If ‖d‖M ∈ COi & X,Y ∈ OBi then X ∩ Y ∈ OBi.31
Before closing with a brief discussion of a problem, let me note some avenues for further
exploration. We could easily introduce another deontic constant, d ′, to model “all Doe’s
agential obligations are met” (by him, of course). Then, for example, we would want to val-
idate d → d ′, but not vice versa. Similarly, we could impose an importance ordering on the
propositions that constitute Doe’s responsibilities,32 and define the notion of a strict obliga-
tion, an overridden obligation, etc., along with additional deontic constants. We could then
29 Recall that COi = {X: X ∩ {j: COij} =∅}, the ability-consistent propositions.
30 See the related discussion of the CO relation and the definition of ability in [21] for the need to address
related issues.
31 This is a consequence of OB-m, and the more recent constraint, if ‖d‖M ∈ COi then ‖d‖M ∈ OBi .
32 The resources in [21] might adapt well for this.
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express claims like “all the strict (most important) demands on Doe can be met, but not all
demands on him can be met” and “if all of Doe’s demands can be satisfied, then none of
his obligations are overridden”. Clearly, the generalization to multi-agent contexts would
also be of interest, so that we could model Carmo’s slippage problem explicitly, and show
how the current strategy escapes it. Finally, with the introduction of predicates and names,
we could represent obligations of the form: S is obligated to be F (e.g., to be in Boston
or to be cooperative). But we must also face a problem requiring further qualification on
principles of aggregation, using a more fine-grained approach to obligations.
2.4. Refining aggregation in conflict-allowing contexts
Recall our qualification of OB-C (simple aggregation):33
OB-C′: CO(p & q) →· (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q)
We indicated that we would ask later if OB-C′ is qualification enough of full-fledged ag-
gregation. It is not.
Hansen’s objection. Suppose PR(p → p′), PR(q → q′), and ∼CO(p & q), but CO(p′ & q′).
Then by OB-RM′, from OBp & OBq, we have OBp′ & OBq′. But then by OB-C′, we get
OB(p′ & q′).34
For example, let
p: I keep an appointment this morning in Montreal.
p′: I travel to Montreal this morning.
q: I keep an appointment in London this afternoon.
q′: I travel to London this morning.
Imagine that although keeping the appointments in Montreal and in London respectively
necessitate traveling to Montreal this morning and traveling to London this morning, and
although keeping both appointments is not open to me, nonetheless traveling to both places
this morning is open to me (e.g., I could drive directly to a Montreal airport and fly to Lon-
don late this morning). However, since the traveling obligations derive respectively and
exclusively from two obligations that conflict, despite the joint realizability of these two
derivative traveling obligations, no singular conjunctive obligation to travel to both places
actually follows from them. Notice that the problem can’t be easily solved by restricting
OB-RM′, since in the example above, p′ and q′ express contingent truths associated with
actions in my power that are practical prerequisites to p and to q respectively. Even the most
reasonably restricted version of OB-RM′ must allow such inferences to go through. So it
appears that OB-C′ is at fault. Though a significant improvement over OB-C, it nonethe-
less allows us to indirectly derive pointless conjunctive obligations from obligations that
conflict. A faithful representation of conflicting obligations must disallow such pointless
derivative obligations.
33 OB-C is (OBp & OBq) → OB(p & q).
34 Jorg Hansen brought this objection to my attention at DEON’02. The basic idea for the solution proposed
here occurred to me there, but I note that it is similar to that avowed by Hansen himself in Section 5 of [12].
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Here I give a rapid impressionistic sketch of a solution to be developed elsewhere. I ig-
nore agency.
Intuition: In conflict-allowing contexts, we need to restrict the application of deontic
aggregation to mutually consistent basic obligations and deontic consequences of un-
problematic pedigree. To do so, it will help to distinguish basic from non-basic (deriva-
tive) obligations, and to distinguish unary-sourced deontic consequences from problem-
atic/unproblematic multi-sourced deontic consequences.
Assume we have the earlier system KT for PR and CO. Suppose also that we have
propositional quantifiers in our language. Now add one undefined operator, BO, where
BOp means p is a basic obligation (as opposed to a derived one). We assume that BO
satisfies just these principles:
BO-CO: BOp → COp35
BO-RE: If  p ↔ q then  BOp ↔ BOq36
We use minimal models again
BO : W → Pow(Pow(W)) i.e. BOi ⊆ Pow(W),
M |=i BOp iff ‖p‖M ∈ BOi .
For BO-CO, we stipulate:
If X ∈ BOi then ∃j(COij & j ∈ X).
Although not necessary, we assume that the number of basic obligations is finite:
∀i ∈ W, ∃X1 . . .Xn such that BOi = {X1, . . . ,Xn}, where n 0.
These humble beginnings are deceptively powerful, as we will try to quickly illustrate.
Let p be obligatory iff there is an ability-consistent (finite) set of basic obligations that
necessitate p:
OBp =
df
∃q1 . . .qn
[
(BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn)
& PR
(
(q1 & · · ·& qn) → p
)]
.
The clause, CO(q1 & · · ·& qn), is necessary, else any conflicting obligations would render
everything obligatory. Note some theorems:
BOp → OBp
OBp → COp
PR(p → q) → (BOp → OBq)
PR(p → q) → (OBp → OBq).
35 This axiom need not be basic, but it facilitates a fast sketch.
36 Not including BO-M is defensible, but that defense must wait.
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Where (BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn) & PR((q1 & · · ·& qn) → p) we will
say that “(q1 & · · ·& qn) is a basis for OBp”.
We note in passing that the increased expressive resources are significant. To illustrate:
SOp =
df
∃q(BOq & PR(q → p)) [Singly Obligatory]
JOp =
df
OBp & ∼SOp [Jointly Obligatory]
IOp =
df
OBp & ∼BOp [Indirectly Obligatory].
Here are some derivable relationships:
BOp → SOp JOp → IOp
SOp → ∼JOp IOp → OBp
BOp → ∼JOp BOp → ∼IOp
OBp ↔ (SOp ∨ JPp) OBp ↔ (BOp ∨ IOp).
Let us now return to Hansen’s problem. Suppose I am under exactly two basic obliga-
tions, BOp & BOq.37 Each is ability-consistent with itself, and the first necessitates p′, and
the second necessitates q′. So OBp′ and OBq′. However it does not follow that OB(p′ & q′).
For there is no finite set of ability-consistent basic obligations that necessitates (p′ & q′).
Note that the following aggregation principle for basic obligations is directly derivable
from our new definition of OB (and our KT logic for PR):
BO-C′: CO(p1 & · · ·& pn) · → (BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn) → OB(p1 & · · ·& pn).38
But a crucial question is how does aggregation work in other cases, and how might we
define the notion of a (non-basic) obligation of aggregation-unproblematic pedigree?
First define permissibility:
PEp =
df
∼OB∼p,
which entails:
PEp ↔ ∀q1 . . .qn
[
BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn)
· → CO(p & q1 & · · ·& qn)
]
.
Clearly, not all things that are obligatory are permissible. This is a theorem:
OBp & OBq & ∼CO(p & q) → (∼PEp & ∼PEq).
Now what of permissible obligations,
POp =
df
OBp & PEp,
37 This is sloppy, since BO-RE gives us infinitely many equivalent formulas, but it is convenient, since these
represent just two obligations.
38 This is just a generalized BO-analog of our earlier OB-C′ , but the restriction to BO is crucial.
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obligations that are consistent with any jointly consistent basic obligations? Are those fully
unproblematic for aggregation? Let’s consider this proposal for a moment:
p is an aggregation unproblematic obligation iff POp.
This doesn’t work since this fails:
POp & POq · → PO(p & q).
For example, let my basic obligations be just these (and their equivalents): BOp, BOq,
BO(∼p ∨ ∼q). So OBp, OBq. Assume that COp, COq, CO(∼p ∨ ∼q), CO(p & q),
CO(p & ∼q), and CO(q & ∼p). So PEp & PEq, since by exhaustion of cases, p and q are
each compatible with any jointly consistent basic obligations. Hence, POp & POq. What of
PO(p & q)? Consider OB(p & q) first. Since BOp & BOq & CO(p & q) and PR((p & q) →
(p & q)), OB(p & q). But consider PE(p & q): ∀q1 . . .qn[(BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 &
· · ·& qn) → CO(p & q & q1 & · · ·& qn)]. Does this hold? No. For BO(∼p ∨ ∼q) &
CO(∼p ∨ ∼q), yet clearly ∼CO(p & q & ∼p ∨ ∼q). So ∼PO(p & q).
Instead, let us define an unproblematic obligation not as a permissible one, but as one
with a permissible basis:
UOp =
df
∃p1 . . .pn
[
(BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn) & CO(p1 & · · ·& pn) &
PR
(
(p1 & · · ·& pn) → p
)
& PE(p1 & · · ·& pn)
]
.
Fully ticketed, the definiens is:
∃p1 . . .pn
[
(BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn) & CO(p1 & · · ·& pn) &
PR
(
(p1 & · · ·& pn) → p
)]
&
∀q1 . . .qn
[
(BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn)
· → CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn)
]
.
These are easily derived:
UOp → OBp
UOp → PEp.
Our new definition is very close to the one just rejected, but the crucial difference is that
with OBp & PEp, no link is made between the basis for OBp and permissibility. This
difference is crucial, as the following is now provable
UO-C′: UOp & UOq → UO(p & q).
Proof. We assume (1) UOp and (2) UOq. We need to show UO(p & q), i.e., ∃r1 . . .
rn[(BOr1 & · · ·& BOrn) & CO(r1 & · · ·& rn) & PR((r1 & · · ·& rn) → (p & q))] & [PE(r1 &
· · ·& rn)].
Since UOp and UOq, there is a permissible basis for each:
(1) ∃p1 . . .pn[(BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn) & CO(p1 & · · ·& pn) & PR((p1 & · · ·& pn) → p)
& PE(p1 & · · ·& pn)] and
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(2) ∃q1 . . .qn[(BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn) & PR((q1 & · · ·& qn) → q)
& PE(q1 & · · ·& qn)].
Fixing p1 . . .pn, and q1 . . .qn, we get:
(1a) (BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn) & CO(p1 & · · ·& pn) & PR((p1 & · · ·& pn) → p) &
(1b) PE(p1 & · · ·& pn) and
(2a) (BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn) & PR((q1 & · · ·& qn) → q) &
(2b) PE(q1 & · · ·& qn).
We will show OU(p & q) by showing an instance of its existential definiens, namely an
instance of the form:
(i) (BOr1 & · · ·& BOrn) & CO(r1 & · · ·& rn) & PR((r1 & · · ·& rn) → (p & q))] &
(ii) PE(r1 & · · ·& rn)].
(i) First, from (2a), (BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn), and from (1b),
PE(p1 & · · ·& pn). From these, it follows that CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn). But then
given BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn from (1a), we get (BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn & BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn)
& CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn). But since by (1a) and (2a), PR((p1 & · · ·& pn) → p)
and PR((q1 & · · ·& qn) → q), it follows that
PR(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn) → (p & q).
So we have (BOp1 & · · ·& BOpn & BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn) & CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·
& qn) & PR((p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn) → (p & q).39
(ii) It remains to be shown that PE(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn), i.e.,
∀s1 . . . sn
[(
(BOs1& · · ·& BOsn) & CO(s1 & · · ·& sn)
)
→ CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·& qn & s1 & · · ·& sn)
]
.
Assume (BOs1 & · · ·& BOsn) & CO(s1 & · · ·& sn). We need to show that CO(p1 & · · ·& pn
& q1 & · · ·& qn & s1 & · · ·& sn). Since by (2b), PE(q1 & · · ·& qn), it follows from
our assumption that CO(q1 & · · ·& qn & s1 & · · ·& sn). But then from our assump-
tion and (2a), it follows that (BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn & BOs1 & · · ·& BOsn). So we have
(BOq1 & · · ·& BOqn & BOs1 & · · ·& BOsn) & CO(q1 & · · ·& qn & s1 & · · ·& sn). But
then this, along with 1b), namely PE(p1 & · · ·& pn), implies CO(p1 & · · ·& pn & q1 & · · ·
& qn & s1 & · · ·& sn). 
Using UO-C′, an induction shows that this generalization holds:
UOp1 & · · ·& UOpn· → UO(p1 & · · ·& pn)
And since we have UOp → OBp, the latter implies:
UOp1 & · · ·& UOpn· → OB(p1 & · · ·& pn).
39 This already suffices for OB(p & q), but the stronger UO(p & q) is needed to generate the last generalization.
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We hope this sketch suggests that the approach holds considerable promise. The ap-
proach allows for the definition of a wide variety of notions, including other notions
connected with an obligation’s pedigree and aggregation. Finally, we believe that it readily
solves versions of van Fraassen’s largely neglected puzzle.40
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